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ExecutiveSummary

The inland waterway system is a vital part of the nation’s multiͲmodal freight network.
Although less visible than other modes, inland waterways allow shippers to transport bulk
commodities in a relatively cheap and environmentallyͲfriendly method.  To ensure this
transportationmoderemainsafeasibleoptionandaccommodatesgrowth,itmustcontinueto
be safe, efficient, and functional.  This synthesis provides comprehensive perspective on the
financial prospects of the inland waterways system.  It analyzes current funding levels, along
withproposedfundingchangesandreforms.

Financial support for the inland waterways system comes from the Inland Waterways Trust
Fund(IWTF).HistoricaldatagatheredprovidesevidencethattheIWTFresourceshaverapidly
declinedinrecentyears,limitingthenumberofinfrastructureprojectsthatcanbeundertaken.
Some of this is can be attributed to the lack of a fuel tax increase since 1995.  The fuel tax
serves as the primary revenue source for the IWTF.  The purchasing power of each dollar is
thereforeerodedduetotheincreaseofconstructioncosts,coupledwiththetaxrevenuenot
increasing.  In order to reinforce the IWTF and deal with amounting project backlog, several
funding reforms have been proposed in addition to changes in project delivery and
prioritization.  Many reforms include raising the fuel tax and changing the current cost share
structure.  Other proposals lay out different options, such as tolling locks and dams or
institutinglicensefees.InordertoreversethedeclineoftheIWTF,itappearsthatsubstantive
changesmayberequired.

Thepastandcurrentstateofthesystemalsoprovidesinsightastohowpreviousinvestment
levelshaveimpactedreliability.Measuresoflockperformance,suchasthenumberofoutages
(bothscheduledandunscheduled)andthedurationoflockoutages,areusedtoassesssystem
dependability.  These reveal that in recent years there has been an increase in outages and
outage durations.  Possible factors include a reduction in funding for construction and
maintenanceprojects,whichcompoundstheincreasinginfrastructureageissue.Unexpected
closures impact shippers by causing unplanned delays.  These delays increase costs of inland
waterwayshipmentsbyidlingfreightandreducingreliability.Inturn,reducedsystemreliability
maypromptmodalshiftsasfreightshippersseekmoreconsistentmodesoftransport.

This synthesis provides valuable information for stakeholders and policymakers regarding
currentfundinglevelsandinvestmentsintheinlandwaterwaysystem.Theinitialevidencein
this report shows that declining funding levels, coupled with aging locks and dams, are likely
contributingtoincreasesinlockoutages.Ifsuchissuesaretoberectified,thereformsdetailed
hereprovideastartingpointforchangingthecurrentfundingregime.
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I.Introduction

The12,000commerciallynavigablemilesoftheU.S.inlandwaterwaysystemconstituteavital
cog in the nation’s transportation system, carrying over 800 million tons of domestic goods
annually  (U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineers,2012).Theinlandwaterwaysystemprovidesamore
fuelͲefficientandenvironmentallyͲfriendlywaytotransportfreightcomparedtoothermodes
of transportation.  For each gallon of fuel, a barge can carry one ton of freight 530 miles, as
comparedto420viatrainand70viatruck(U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineers,2008).Bargecargo
capacitiesare15timesgreaterthanrailtransport,and60timesgreaterthantrucktransport.
Withincreasingfuelcosts,environmentalissues,andprojectedincreasesinfreightshipments1,
theinlandwaterwaysystemislikelytobecomeincreasinglyutilizedforthemovementofbulk
commoditiessuchascoalandgrain.2


Barge on the Ohio River, in Northern
Kentucky




Toadequatelydiscussthefutureoftheinlandwaterwaysystemanditsabilitytoaccommodate
increasedtraffic,thecurrentfundingstructureformaintainingandimprovingthesystemmust
becomprehensivelyexamined.Theadequacyoffundinglevelsislikelytodeterminetheextent
to which the inland waterway system will be used in the future.  This synthesis summarizes
criticalinformationrelatedtothecurrentstatusofinlandwaterwayfunding,fundingreforms
thatcouldbeimplemented,andthepresentconditionofthesystem.




1

SeetheFederalHighwayAdministration’sFreightAnalysisFrameworkat
http://www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freight/freight_analysis/faf/.
2
Bray,Murphree,andDager(2011)notetheimportanceoftheOhioRiversystemtocoalshipmentsandtheMississippiRiver
tograinshipments.
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Allofthisinformationhasbeencollectedtoinformdecisionmakersandmaximizetheabilityof
theinlandwaterwaystocatalyzesustainedeconomicgrowth.Althoughtheprojectselection
processandregulatorybudgetingareintegraltothefundingprocess(eachisdiscussedbriefly
in this report), the focus is primarily on funding mechanisms.  Despite the importance of
adequatefundingfortheinlandwaterwaysystem,thisisoftenneglectedwheninfrastructure
dollars are scarce.  As noted by many researchers and government officials, the current
transportation system infrastructure is aging and deteriorating.  The average lock and dam
facility is approaching 50 years old (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2012).  In an era of tight
budgetsforinfrastructureinvestment,itisvitaltoevaluatehowtheinlandwaterwaysystemis
currently funded and whether this funding is sufficient for maintaining the system in the
present,albeittenuous,operationalstate.

Otherfundingissuesarisefromincreasedcostsduetoprojectdelays,theincreasingcostof
newprojects,anddelayedmaintenance.Insufficientfundingcausesinlandwaterwaysystem
performancetosuffer,whichdecreasesreliabilityandincreasesshippingtimes.Thissituation
contributestoindustryreticenceregardingthemaximizationoftransportationcapabilities.
Despitethecostadvantageofshippingviatheinlandwaterways,manyshipperscouldoptto
transportcommoditiesusinganothermethodifinlandwaterwayfundingisinadequate.Ifthis
occurs,additionalstrainwillbeplacedonhighwayandraillines.Asaresultoflimitedfunding
andconcernsaboutsystemreliability,thereisamountinginterestinlookingforflexibleand
innovativefundingalternatives.Thisinvolvesidentifyingproposalsthatreformorcompletely
transformthecurrentfundingregime.

The information outlined in this synthesis provides a thorough overview of funding for the
inland waterway system and recommends potential avenues of reform that will inform
policymakers’andstakeholders’decisionsmovingforward.ThepaperthenreviewstheIWTF,
proposed changes to the current funding system, and examines the inland waterway system
withanemphasisonlockoutages.


II.InlandWaterwaysTrustFund

The Inland Waterways Trust Fund (IWTF) currently serves as the primary funding source for
muchoftheconstructionandrehabilitationworkontheinlandwaterwayssystem.Thefundis
financed with a 20 cent per gallon fuel tax levied on barge and towing companies.  Current
constructionandmajorrehabilitationprojects3arefundedona50/50basisfromthetrustfund
andthefederalgovernment.
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DefinedinUSACECivilWorksDirectProgrambasedonfollowingcriteria:approvalbySecretaryofArmy,minimumoftwo
fiscalyearsforcompletion,capitalcostsareover$14.5millionforreliabilityimprovementprojectsorover$1.8millionfor
efficiencyimprovements,andincludesstructuralimprovementsthatextendworkinglifeorincreaseoperationalefficiency.
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However, operations and maintenance along the system are funded entirely by the federal
government (Pointon, 2013).  These costs have consistently exceeded construction and
rehabilitationcosts,averagingover$500millionannually(Stern,2013).Interestisalsoearned
on unspent balances in the fund. The IWTF was established as part of the Inland Waterways
Revenue Act of 1978, which created a fuel tax at 4 cents per gallon and designated 26
waterwaysthatwouldbesubjecttothislevy.In1986,theWaterResourcesDevelopmentAct
(WRDA) established the Inland Waterways Users Board4 and created the precedent for the
50/50costshare.TheUsersBoard’sresponsibilityistoprioritizeprojectsandmakespending
recommendations, and it consists of 11 members chosen by the Secretary of the Army.
Membershipontheboardisdesignedtoberepresentativeofshippinginterests,geographical
areasservedbythewaterways,andtonnageshippedonindividualwaterways(Stern,2013).

Additionally,theWRDAauthorizedagradualincreaseinthefueltaxto20centspergallonin
1995, and added the TennesseeͲTombigbee Waterway to the list of taxable waterways
(Pointon, 2013).  The law also mandated that Congress authorize construction projects and
fundthemusingannualappropriations:

“Together,theactsof1978and1986establishedafueltaxoncommercialbarges,costͲshare
requirements for inland waterway projects, and a trust fund to hold these revenues and fund
investments in construction.  The overall effect of these changes was a greater financial and
decisionͲmaking responsibility for commercial operators on the inland waterway system.”
(Stern,2013,p.4)

Figure 1 illustrates price changes in the fuel tax (1980Ͳ2012).  Congressional authorization is
generallyrequiredtofundprojects,buttheseauthorizationsdonotincludeplanningforfuture
fundingofmultiͲyearprojects.Thisoftenproducessignificantuncertaintyoverfuturefunding
levels.  Such an approach leads to inefficiencies and needlessly prolonged construction
timelines, which increases costs and diminishes the amount of funding available for other
projects.











4

Section302oftheWaterResourcesDevelopmentAct1986specifiesthattheUsersBoardconsistofupto11members
appointedbytheSecretaryoftheArmy.
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Figure1:InlandWaterwaysFuelTax
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Itisimportanttonotethetaxhasremainedunchangedsince1995andthusremainsunadjusted
toaccountforinflation.Ifthefueltaxwereindexedtoinflation—asmeasuredbytheConsumer
PriceIndex—fuelwouldcurrentlybetaxedat31centspergallon.
Figure2showsamapofthetaxablewaterwaysintheUnitedStates.Themajorityofactivity
centersontheOhioandMississippiRiversandtheirtributaries.
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Figure2



Source:InlandWaterwaysUsersBoardAnnualReport(2012)



TheinlandwaterwaysdepictedinFigure2aredescribedinTable1onthefollowingpage.The
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) maintains responsibility for these waterways, which
encompass38statesandcarryover8percentofallnationalfreighttraffic(Stern,2013).
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Table1:ListofTaxableInlandWaterways
1.AlabamaͲCoosaRivers:FromjunctionwiththeTombigbeeRiveratrivermile(hereinafterreferredtoasRM)0tojunctionwithCoosaRiverat
RM314.
2.AlleghenyRiver:FromconfluencewiththeMonongahelaRivertoformtheOhioRiveratRM0totheheadoftheexistingprojectatEastBrady,
Pennsylvania,RM72.
3.ApalachicolaͲChattahoocheeandFlintRivers(ACF):ApalachicolaRiverfrommouthatApalachicolaBay(intersectionwiththeGulfIntracoastal
Waterway)RM0tojunctionwithChattahoocheeandFlintRiversatRM107.8.ChattahoocheeRiverfromjunctionwithApalachicolaandFlint
RiversatRM0toColumbus,GeorgiaatRM155andFlintRiver,fromjunctionwithApalachicolaandChattahoocheeRiversatRM0toBainbridge,
Georgia,atRM28.
4.ArkansasRiver(McClellanͲKerrArkansasRiverNavigationSystem):FromjunctionwithMississippiRiveratRM0toPortofCatoosa,Oklahoma,
atRM448.2.
5.AtchafalayaRiver:FromRM0atitsintersectionwiththeGulfIntracoastalWaterwayatMorganCity,Louisiana,upstreamtojunctionwithRed
RiveratRM116.8.
6.AtlanticIntracoastalWaterway:TwoinlandwaterwayroutesapproximatelyparallelingtheAtlanticcoastbetweenNorfolk,Virginia,andMiami,
Florida,for1,192milesviaboththeAlbemarleandChesapeakeCanalandGreatDismalSwampCanalroutes.
7.BlackWarriorͲTombigbeeͲMobileRivers:BlackWarriorRiverSystemfromRM2.9,MobileRiver(atChickasawCreek)toconfluencewith
TombigbeeRiveratRM45.TombigbeeRiver(toDemopolisatRM215.4)toportofBirmingham,RM's374Ͳ411andupstreamtoheadofnavigation
onMulberryFork(RM429.6),LocustFork(RM407.8),andSipseyFork(RM430.4).
8.ColumbiaRiver(ColumbiaͲSnakeRiversInlandWaterways):FromtheDallesatRM191.5toPasco,Washington(McNaryPool),atRM330,
SnakeRiverfromRM0atthemouthtoRM231.5atJohnsonBarLanding,Idaho.
9.CumberlandRiver:JunctionwithOhioRiveratRM0toheadofnavigation,upstreamtoCarthage,Tennessee,atRM313.5.
10.GreenandBarrenRivers:GreenRiverfromjunctionwiththeOhioRiveratRM0toheadofnavigationatRM149.1.
11.GulfIntracoastalWaterway:FromSt.Mark'sRiver,Florida,toBrownsville,Texas,1,134.5miles.
12.IllinoisWaterway(CalumetͲSagChannel):FromthejunctionoftheIllinoisRiverwiththeMississippiRiverRM0toChicagoHarboratLake
Michigan,approximatelyRM350.
13.KanawhaRiver:FromjunctionwithOhioRiveratRM0toRM90.6atDeepwater,WestVirginia.
14.KaskaskiaRiver:FromjunctionwithMississippiRiveratRM0toRM36.2atFayetteville,Illinois.
15.KentuckyRiver:FromjunctionwithOhioRiveratRM0toconfluenceofMiddleandNorthForksatRM258.6.
16.LowerMississippiRiver:FromBatonRouge,Louisiana,RM233.9toCairo,Illinois,RM953.8.
17.UpperMississippiRiver:FromCairo,Illinois,RM953.8toMinneapolis,Minnesota,RM1,811.4.
18.MissouriRiver:FromjunctionwithMississippiRiveratRM0toSiouxCity,Iowa,atRM734.8.
19.MonongahelaRiver:FromjunctionwithAlleghenyRivertoformtheOhioRiveratRM0tojunctionoftheTygartandWestForkRivers,
Fairmont,WestVirginia,atRM128.7.
20.OhioRiver:FromjunctionwiththeMississippiRiveratRM0tojunctionoftheAlleghenyandMonongahelaRiversatPittsburgh,Pennsylvania,
atRM981.
21.OuachitaͲBlackRivers:FromthemouthoftheBlackRiveratitsjunctionwiththeRedRiveratRM0toRM351atCamden,Arkansas.
22.PearlRiver:FromjunctionofWestPearlRiverwiththeRigoletsatRM0toBogalusa,Louisiana,RM58.
23.RedRiver:FromRM0tothemouthofCypressBayouatRM236.
24.TennesseeRiver:FromjunctionwithOhioRiveratRM0toconfluencewithHolsteinandFrenchRiversatRM652.
25.WhiteRiver:FromRM9.8toRM255atNewport,Arkansas.
26.WillametteRiver:FromRM21upstreamofPortland,Oregon,toHarrisburg,Oregon,atRM194.
27.TennesseeͲTombigbeeWaterway:FromitsconfluencewiththeTennesseeRivertotheWarriorRiveratDemopolis,Tennessee.

Source:USACE
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Outlays from the fund are based on monthly receipts (Pointon, 2013).  Annual trust fund
revenues(inmillionsofdollars)from1988Ͳ2012areshowninFigure3.Thesefigureshavebeen
adjusted to 2012 dollars which account for inflation.  To make appropriate adjustments that
reflect construction inflation on the inland waterway system, the USACE Civil Works
Construction Cost Index System was used.  This adjustment reveals the increases in
construction costs from 2000 to 2010; during this period costs went up approximately 45
percent(Carter&Stern,2010).

In nominal terms, revenues have flat lined since the late 1990s, yet in real terms there is a
pronounced downward trend.  Since 2001, real revenues have declined each year, with the
exceptionof2007and2011whensmallincreasesoccurred.Receiptsinfiscalyear2012were
$89.3 million. Of that amount, $88.6 million was disbursed for projects (U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 2012).  This total pales in comparison to the American Society of Civil Engineer’s
2013ReportCard,whichestimatedcapitalneedsof$18billionoverthenexttwentyyears.

Figure3:InlandWaterwaysTrustFundRevenues
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Source:U.S.TreasuryDepartmentandUSACE

Themostpressingissuesfacingthetrustfundpertaintorevenueshortfalls,whichimpedework
on new construction and rehabilitation projects.  According to the American Society of Civil
Engineers’ 2013 Failure to Act Report, only 50 percent of the inland waterway infrastructure
and marine port needs will be sufficiently funded through 2040.  Stern (2013) describes the
situationas“limitingthenumberofnewandongoinginlandwaterwayconstructionprojects”
(p.1).Fundingshortfallshavepushedincreasedcostsontohouseholdsandbusinesses;current
estimatesplacethesecostsatover$1.2trillion.Thereportalsocitedotherconsequencesthat
will result from insufficient funding, including export losses topping $2 trillion by 2040, and
9

projectedjoblossesinexcessof700,000.Inadequatefundingwillalsoreverberateintheprice
ofgoodsandnegativelyaffectdisposableincomeformanyAmericans.

Figure4displaysIWTFbalancesfrom1988Ͳ2012inbothnominaland2012dollars.Itisevident
thatbalanceshaveprecipitouslydeclined.Nominalbalanceshavedroppednearly90percent
(fromahighof$412.6millionin2002,to$44.8millionin2012).Inrealdollars,thedeclinehas
beenevengreater.Using2012currencyvaluesasthebaseline,trustfundbalanceshavefallen
overthisperiodnearly$600milliondollars,althoughtherehasnotbeenasmoothdownward
trend.Balancedeclinesintheearly1990swereoffsetbyasubsequentrebound;butthefallsin
recentyearshavebeenmoresharplyfeltbecausetheIWTFisnearingazerobalance.

Figure4:InlandWaterwaysTrustFundBalances
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Sharpbalancedeclinesstemfromincreasedprojectappropriations,decliningreceipts,andcost
overruns (Stern, 2013).  Due to a lack of funding and a viable cost sharing mechanism, new
constructionprojectsmustbeprioritized.Increasesinappropriationsbeganin2005,asgreater
investments in IWTF projects were approved.  This produced a situation where expenditures
outpacedrevenues,contributingtotheabruptdecreaseinbalancesinsubsequentyears(Stern,
2013).  The decline in revenues has also contributed to project backlogs. When coupled with
increasing costs and extended project times, these developments have placed the viability of
thecurrentbusinessmodelindoubt(Hammond,2013).
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CongresshastakenseveralstepstoslowtherapiddeclineintheIWTFincluding:


1)Exemptingrehabilitationprojectsfromcostsharing

2) Exempting cost share requirements for $400 million in construction funds appropriated via
theAmericanRecoveryandReinvestmentAct

3)Prohibitingnewconstructioncontracts

4)Limitingappropriationssotheymatchanticipatedrevenues.

Additional funding concerns, outside of the IWTF, center on annual appropriations for
operations and maintenance.  While capital expenditures are an important component of
inlandwaterwayfunding,maintainingthesystemingoodworkingorderiscriticaltopreserve
its reliability and efficiency.  In FY 2010, $2.5 billion was requested for operations and
maintenance.However,only$2.4billionwasappropriated(GAO,2010).

Given that operations and maintenance appropriations are drawn from general federal
revenues, uncertainty can arise if there is a lack of consensus between Congress and
Presidential administrations over funding levels (Grier, 2002).  Additional cost issues center
around the Olmstead Lock and Dam on the Ohio River.  Olmstead has received a significant
proportionoffundsduetocostoverruns.Totalprojectcostshaveshotupfromanestimated
$1 billion to over $3 billion as of 2012 (Stern, 2013). Cost overruns and lengthening
constructiontimelinesproduceacascadeeffect,whichleavesotherkeyprojectsunderfunded
ornotfundedatall.

11

Olmstead Lock and Dam – Louisville, Kentucky District



III.PotentialFunding/InlandWaterwayTrustFundReforms




AlthoughthecurrentrevenuestructureoftheIWTF,whichiscomprisedoffueltaxes,appears
to have been sufficient at one time, there are issues of great concern.  The lack of inflation
indexing, increasing project needs due to aging infrastructure, and the current state of the
fund, all underline the importance of adopting policy changes to improve the IWTF’s fiscal
position,alongwithidentifyingnewwaystoincreaseoperationsandmaintenancefunding.

Given the IWTF’s plummeting balance, there have been a number of proposals offered by
various organizations and the federal government to alleviate revenue shortfalls. Although
some reforms have been implemented, further policy shifts are necessary. Many of the
proposedchangesseektoimprovetheprojectidentificationanddeliveryprocesswhileraising
additionalfunds,eitherbyreplacingthefueltaxoutrightorincreasingitabovethecurrentrate.
Based on the trajectory of past reform proposals, the impetus to alter the current funding
structureordevelopnewrevenuesourceshasbeenasourceofconversationforsometime.
12


Whenevaluatingwhethertochangefundingstructures,CaseandLave(1977)notethatseveral
criteria that should be enhanced through user charges that include efficiency5, equity, and
administrativesimplicity.Theydescribeanumberofuserchargeregimesincludingfueltaxes,
annual license fees, segment tolls, lockage fees, and congestion tools, many of which remain
salientgiventhecurrentfundingissuesfacingtheinlandwaterwayssystem.Increasingthefuel
tax,anoptionmanyreformproposalscontaintoday,iscitedasbeneficialduetoadministrative
simplicity.However,itfailstomeettheefficiencycriterionasitwouldsubsidizewaterwayswith
lowertrafficvolumesattheexpenseofhigher trafficsegments.Additionally,raisingthefuel
taxcouldreducecongestionbyshiftingfreighttoothermodesifthecostdifferentialofthetax
increase was significant.  Annual license fees could be levied on barges.  This could be
accomplishedwithcostsdeterminedbytheannualoperationandmaintenanceneedsdivided
bytotaltraffic,orbyrevenuesneededtofundpriorityconstructionprojects.



Hickman-Fulton County Riverport (Hickman, Kentucky)


5





DefinedbytheCongressionalBudgetOffice(1992)as“chargingusersapriceequaltomarginalsocialcost”(p.63).
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Intermsofadministration,CaseandLavenotedthatthispolicyissimilartothefueltax,yetthe
tax incidence does not necessarily fall on the waterway incurring the usage.  This situation
leavesthecriteriaofequityandefficiencyunmet.Anotherpossibility,segmenttolling,would
imposechargesatcertainpointsalongthesystem.Thiswouldefficientlydistributethecosts
based on usage.  The main benefit of this structure is the administrative simplicity.  Like
segmenttolling,lockagefeesarecollectedeachtimeavesseltransitsalock.Theefficiencyand
equity of such scenarios hinge on the pricing structure.  If volume determines charges, then
segments and locks with higher traffic flows would have lower rates than less travelled
segmentsandlocks.ThiscouldreduceindividualcostsinalreadyͲcongestedareas,leadingto
noimpactoncongestion,andpotentiallyincreasecongestion.Distributingcostsevenlyacross
thesystemwouldnotsolvetheproblemsofefficiencyandequityinafairmanner.

Finally,congestiontollingisproposedwiththreedifferentstructures:auctioningqueuespots,
charging individual barges a per hour delay fee for each barge that is waiting (vessels would
have the option to vacate their position), and a per hour delay fee with no option to vacate
queue position.  No one proposal meets all of the evaluation criteria.  Balancing desired
outcomes with needed funding levels will likely remain the overriding litmus test of any
proposed reform.  Case and Lave detailed which proposals are more likely to meet each
criterion previously defined by stating “If efficiency is the prime concern, a segment toll plus
lockingfeeandcongestiontollͲsuitablyaveragetoattainadministrativesimplicityͲarebest.If
equity and simplicity are the prime concerns, the segment toll might be set to bring total
receiptsuptothemaintenanceandinvestmentcostassociatedwitheachsegment.”(Caseand
Love,p.818)

TheCongressionalBudgetOffice’s(1992)analysisofwaterwaysfundingfeaturedanumberof
proposals,includingsomehighlightedpreviouslybyCaseandLave(1977).Thestudypresents
criteriausedtoassessproposalswithavarietyofpotentialfundingoptions.Thefirststepin
decidingwhatchargestoextractisdonebydeterminingwhethertolevyachargeontheentire
inlandwaterwaysystem,orifthefeestructureshouldbedesignedbasedonthecharacteristics
of individual waterways.  This approach would increase efficiency by reducing subsidization
fromlowcostwaterwaystohighercostwaterways.Secondly,thefundingstructuremustbe
defined to distinguish between charging to recover operation and maintenance costs, or the
recoveryofprojectcapitalcoststodeterminewhichoffundingalternativeismostpractical.
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The individual funding arrangements identified by the Congressional Budget Office are listed
below:

Table2:CongressionalBudgetOffice(1992)InlandWaterwayUserFundingOptions

RecoveryofOperationandMaintenanceCosts

AnnualLicenseFees
Equaltooperationandmaintenancecostsdividedby
numberofbargesusingthewaterway
ChargeEqualtoOperationandMaintenance
Operationandmaintenancecostsdividedbytonmiles
CostperTonͲMile
andchargedtousersonthatbasis
PerͲLockageFee
Operationandmaintenancecostsdividedbytotal
lockages
IncreaseFuelTax
Increasefueltaxsufficienttocoveroperationand
maintenancecosts
ChargeBasedonDemandFactors
Chargesvarybasedonavailabilityofalternativeroutes;
pricingsufficienttocoveroperationandmaintenance
costs
CombinationTolls
UtilizefueltaxandtonͲmilechargesbywaterway
LockandDamCongestionCharge
Chargesbasedonuserswillingtopayforfirstaccessat
congestedlocksanddams
RecoveryofCapitalCosts

AnnualFee
AnnualizedCapitalCostsDividedbyUsers
PerͲUseCharge
CapitalCostsDividedbyNumberofUses
ChargeBasedonDemandFactors
Chargesvarybasedonavailabilityofalternativeroutes;
pricingsufficienttocovercapitalcosts


Thereportconcludesbyobservingthat:

“Existingtaxesimposedonusersofinlandwaterwaysdoesnotraiseenoughrevenuetocover
operationandmaintenancecosts,letalonecostsofnewconstruction”(p.71).

Given that the main revenue source has remained unchanged since 1995, the funding
difficultiesandissuesraisedbythisreportareevenmorepertinenttodaythanwhenthereport
was published in 1992.  The Waterways Council, a national policy organization comprised of
waterway users that advocates on behalf of the inland waterway system, has put forward a
CapitalDevelopmentPlantoimproveinfrastructureonthenation’sinlandwaterways.
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The Waterways Council lobbied to incorporate this plan into the Water Resources
DevelopmentAct(WRDA),whichiscurrentlybeforethe113thCongress.Thegoaloftheplan
isto:

1)Prioritizeprojectsoverthesystem

2)ImproveUSACEprojectmanagementandabilitiestodeliverprojectsontimeandbudget

3)Changefundingmechanismstoensurethesystem’sfutureviability

Source:(Colbert,2013)


These changes would increase cost efficiencies on delayed projects and avoid cost increases
associated with longer project times (Hammond, 2013).  Underwriting these changes are the
goalsoffundingprojectsefficiently,finishingprojectsinatimelymanner,andusingasystem
widecontextwhenconductingprojectanalysis.Thisplanarguesforrankingprojectsbasedon
condition, likelihood of declining performance, consequences of that decline, and return on
investmentsaffectingperformancelevels.Rankingswouldthenbeusedtoprioritizeprojects.

ThistypeofchangeinprioritizationreflectsconcernsGrier(2002)raises,whichsuggestslooking
atthethresholdforprojectfundingandthepotentialreturnoninvestmentsforlockanddam
projects, rather than singularly focusing on benefitͲcost ratios (National Academy of Public
Administration,2007).ThisplanwouldrequiretheUsersBoardtocollaboratewithUSACEto
improve the current model and develop a long term funding strategy (Hammond, 2013).
Outside of using simulations, such a coordinated approach seems applicable to the inland
waterway system.  The USACE is working within budgetary constraints to optimize the
distribution of available funding across a spectrum of potential projects (Wang & Schonfeld,
2005).

The traditional cost sharing structure would also be overhauled.  Construction and major
rehabilitation projects over $100 million would still be shared 50/50 between the federal
governmentandtheIWTF.Rehabilitationprojectslessthat$100millionwouldbecompletely
fundedbythefederalgovernment.Implementingthesechangeswouldrequireoutlaysof$270
million from the federal side and $110 million from the IWTF.  This increase in expenditures
would call for an increase in the fuel tax, or devising some other method of industry funding
(Hammond,2013).Aspreviouslynoted,taxrateincreasesnotindexedforfutureinflationwill
eventually erode purchasing power and impair the system by reducing the number funded
projects.Revenuestructuresthataccountforsuchimpacts,evenifitisnotexplicitlylinkedto
indexing,willshoreupshortandmediumͲtermprojectfundingfortheinlandwaterwaysystem.
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Stern(2013)examinespotentialchangestothecurrentfinancingsystemforinlandwaterways
from two perspectives, the Users Board and the Executive Branch.  Starting with an
examinationofpoliciesimplementedbytheBushAdministration,6Sterndetailsapproachesto
IWTFfunding.Initialproposalsfocusedonreplacingthefueltaxwithlockagefees.Thefees
would be tied to the balance in the IWTF, with fees rising when the balance fell below $25
million and decreasing when it surpassed $75 million.  This change was touted as improving
equity of inland waterway investments, as most capital projects involve locks.  Congress
rejectedthisproposalduetotheincreasingburdensitwouldplaceonlockuserscomparedto
thecurrentfueltaxstructure.

TheObamaAdministrationhasproposedreplacingthefueltaxwithuserfeestoboostrevenues
and increase efficiency.  This proposal would also allow the USACE to increase fees at highͲ
traffic locks.  A more comprehensive option put forward would have maintained the fuel tax
andleviedannualfeestomeetarevenuetarget(Stern,2013).Expansionofthecurrentsystem
so that a larger number of waterways would be subject to user fees was another policy
suggestionthatwasadvanced.However,thisplanwasnotanticipatedtogeneratesignificant
newrevenues.

Althoughoftenatoddswithadministrationattemptstochangethecurrentfinancingstructure
oftheIWTF,theUsersBoardhasofferedseveralalternativeproposals.Theseincluderaising
the fuel tax and altering the current cost sharing structure.  The Users Board has proposed
increasing the fuel tax by 6Ͳ9 cents per gallon, while requiring the federal government to
increase its cost share to 100 percent for dams, cost overruns, and projects between $8 and
$99 million (Stern, 2013).  The increase in the fuel tax would be indexed, and increased to
compensateifrevenuesfallshortofexpectedlevels.

AppropriationswouldalsobedeferredtolettheIWTFbalancerecoverandstabilize.Outsideof
changestotherevenueandcostsharingstructures,theUsersBoardofferedaprojectpriority
listthatrecommendedincreasinginvolvementregardingIWTFprojects.Thiscouldbedoneby
requiring board approval and appointing representatives for each project team (Stern, 2013).
This method would change the way projects are currently selected (by the USACE and the
currentAdministrationandCongress)whileimplementingapriorityrankingsystem.

When determining an optimal investment strategy, it is imperative to account for average
maintenancecosts(CongressionalBudgetOffice,1992).Infrastructureprojectsthatreducethe
average maintenance cost (as well as transit times via reduced congestion, thus benefitting
shippersaswell)willoftenprovecostbeneficialoverthelongͲrun.Includingthesemeasuresas
partofthedecisionͲmakingprocessislikelytoyieldfuturebenefitsfortheIWTFandsystemas
awhole.Addingsuchconsiderationstothedeliberationprocesswillimproveprojectselection
andexecution.

6

For a brief summary of additional administration proposals dating back to FY 1996, see Kruse, Ellis, Protopapas,
and Norboge, 2013 p.13-23.
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A study commissioned by the United Soybean Board (Kruse, Ellis, Protopapas, and Norboge,
2013)7developedabondingalternativetofundwaterwayprojects.Thisapproachallowslarge
capitalintensiveprojectstobeundertakenimmediately,ratherthanfacinginterminabledelays
untilsufficientrevenueshavebeencollected.8Theauthorsciteseveraladvantagesoffunding
projectsthroughbonds,includingthecostreductionsthatresultfrombeginningconstruction
more quickly and the ability to use future revenues to deliver improvements to the current
system.  Three possible methods of applying this funding approach are also discussed: bond
againstIWFTrevenue,raisetheInlandWaterwayFuelTaxby4centsandbondagainstentire
newrevenuestreams,raisetheInlandWaterwayFuelTaxby4centsandbondonlyagainstthe
increase.  Estimates suggest that the three bonding approaches could generate $1.3 billion
(plan1),$1.6billion(plan2),or$275million(plan3)infinancingproceedsintheirfirstyear.
Additional case studies in the report using nonͲdomestic examples reveal that alternative
financing mechanisms are often available and can provide necessary funding to assist in
meetingmoreexpeditedprojecttimelines.

The Inland Marine Transportation Systems (IMTS) Capital Projects Business Model (2010)
arguesforanannualfundinglevelof$380million(halfofwhichistocomefromtheIWTF,and
theotherhalffromthefederalgovernment).Thiswouldrequire50centspergallonincreasein
the fuel tax.  IMTS recognizes a dramatic increase over the current 20 cents is unrealistic.
However,thedisparityrevealsthepressingnatureofneedsfacingthesystemandtheinability
ofthecurrentfundingregimefulfillthem.Giventhatsuchanincreaseiscurrentlyunfeasible,
the report settles on a recommended increase in the fuel tax to at least 26 cents per gallon.
Thereportalsoincludesatablewithdifferentcostsharingoptionstoconsideraspartofamore
sweepingbusinessmodel,withcertainexemptionsforhighdollarprojectssuchasOlmstedand
LowerMon.ThoseoptionsareshowninTable3.















7

Theauthorsalsoconductedastakeholdersurveyforvariouspositionsrelatedtotheinlandwaterways.The
resultscanbefoundinAppendixA.
8

ThelackofprojectfundingforcompletionislistedasabudgetingdeficiencybytheNationalAcademyofPublicAdministration
(2007).
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Table3:CostSharingOptionsConsideredasPartofIMTSCapitalProjectsBusinessModel
Report

BaselineOption–50%Federaland50%IWTF
50/50forNewConstruction,100%FederalforMajorRehabilitation
50/50forNewConstructionandMajorRehabilitationabove$50M,100%FederalforMajorRehabilitation
below$50M
50/50forLocks,100%FederalforDams
50/50forNewConstruction,and75/25forMajorRehabilitation
60%Federal,40%IWTF
65%Federal,35%IWTF
75%Federal,25%IWTF
50%Federal,50%IWTFonallprojectsexceptLowerMonandOlmsted
50%Federal,50%IWTFforNewConstructionandMajorRehabilitationabove$50M(Locks);75%Federal,
25%IWTFforNewConstructionandMajorRehabilitationabove$50M(Dams);100%FederalforMajor
Rehabilitationbelow$50M
50%Federal,50%IWTFforLockNewConstructionandMajorRehabilitationabove$100M;100%Federal
forDamsandLockMajorRehabilitationbelow$100M(withcaponLowerMon)
50%Federal,50%IWTFforLockNewConstructionandMajorRehabilitationabove$50M;100%Federal
forDamsandLockMajorRehabilitationbelow$50M
50%Federal,50%IWTFforLocks;75/25forDams
50%Federal,50%IWTFforLocks;75/25forDams;100%FederalforremainingLowerMon
50%Federal,50%IWTFforLocks;80/20forDams
Source:IMTSCapitalProjectsBusinessModelReport(2010),p.69


The report suggests funding new lock constructions through a 50/50 cost share agreement
betweentheIWTFandfederalgovernment,whereanymajorrehabilitationover$100million
are funded at the same rate.  For dam construction / rehabilitations, and lock rehabilitations
costing under $100 million, the report endorses a 100 percent federal funding from general
appropriations.  Other proposals include establishing costͲshare caps to cope with potential
cost increases and overruns.  While raising additional revenues for the IWTF is the focus of
manyproposals,theallocationandcostsharingissuesdealingwithcurrentfundinghascome
underscrutiny,asnotedintheIMTSCapitalBusinessProjectsModelReport(2010).Facedwith
limitedfunds,thechoicetoallocatemoneycanimpacttrendsinsystemusagebyalteringits
condition and efficiency.  Grier (2002) critiques using tonͲmiles to make budget decisions
because it is a measure that does not provide tributaries with enough credit for freight
shipments. Without such tributaries, many trips would not be possible.  Thus Grier proposes
that funding allocations by waterways use system tonͲmiles.9 Additional considerations may
alsocenteronshippersavingsderivedfromwaterways,includingthosewithlowerusagerates.
9

“SystemtonͲmilesarecomputedbyidentifyingeverycommercialcargocarryingvesselthathaspliedtheinlandwaterwayand
summingtheproductsofthetonstimesthetotaltripmilesforeachvesseltrip.ThetotaltripͲmilesrepresentthetotaldistance
fromorigintodestination”(p.14).
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Although the lack of funding has been highlighted as an obstacle to maintaining the inland
waterwaysysteminafunctionalstate,thewayinwhichcurrentprojectsareundertakenmay
also impact funding levels.  Kruse, Ellis, Protopapas, and Norboge (2013) developed a new
approachtoconstructionandmaintenanceontheinlandwaterwaysystemthatoperatesasan
alternativetothecurrent“buildandexpand”approach.Theauthorsproposedanewstrategy
coined as “repair and sustain”, which includes some elements of past strategies.10  This new
approach privileges maintenance designed to avoid critical failures, allows for major
construction projects only when performance levels dips—permanently—below accepted
thresholds, and staging necessary equipment to hasten repairs when they are needed.
However,implementingthisoptionseemsunlikelygiventhecurrentlackoffunding.

The proposals reviewed here offer plans with different funding methods in an attempt to
increase inland waterway expenditures and therefore preserve the system in a good state of
repair.However,thelevelofdesiredexpendituresandinvestmentinthesystemhasnotbeen
addressed.Isitacceptabletomaintainthestatusquo?Ifnot,whatmetricsshouldbeusedto
identifyatargetlevelofperformance?Also,whatlevelofinvestmentisrequiredtomeetand
sustain the targets identified?  These questions must be parsed within context with of the
system’spresentstate,andtheresidualimpactofpastfundinglevelsonthesystem.


IV.CurrentStateoftheSystem
TherapidIWTFdeclineunderscoresthefundingissuesconfrontingtheinlandwaterwaysystem,
whilealsoraisingquestionsaboutthecurrentsystem’sinfrastructureresiliency.TheUSACE11
runs239lockchambersat193sitesalongthewaterwaysystem(U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineers,
2012).Theaverageageoftheseactivelocksisoverfiftyyears,whichcallsintoquestiontheir
reliability. Aging infrastructure also requires additional investment to remain operational, yet
project authorization currently exceeds available funds (Carter & Stern, 2010).  Many older
locks lack the size and capacity needed for today’s bargetows.  Older facilities typically have
600Ͳfoot chambers, half the size of today’s 1,200 feet standard.  Due to spatial constraints,
many barge tows are separated and moved through these older locks piecemeal, and then
reassembledontheotherside.

Thisaddstotransittimes,increasingcosts12andmakinginlandwaterwaysalesscosteffective
modeforfreighttransport.TheInlandWaterwaysUsersBoardAnnualReport(2012)described
theirconcernsbystating:“TheBoardisincreasinglyconcernedabouttheworseningcondition
of critically important locks and dams on our nation’s waterways and about the growing
inability of our current inland waterways modernization program to adequately address this

10

Thepaststrategiesnotedbytheauthorsare:fixwhenitfails,advancemaintenance,andrehabilitation.
FormoreonthefiscalchallengesfacingtheUSACEasawholeincludingappropriations,projectbacklogs,authorizationsand
direction,andtrustfunds,seeCarterandStern(2010).
12
SeeKruse,Ellis,Protopapas,andNorboge,2013Tables18,19,and20forcalculationsontheadditionalcostsofdoublecuts.
11
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situation” (p.3).  According to Carter and Stern (2010), the construction backlog facing the
USACEwouldcostinexcessof$62billiontoeliminate.

The 2013 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure by the American Society of Civil Engineers
described the dire condition of the inland waterway system and assigned a grade of DͲ13
because:

“Bargesarestoppedforhourseachdaywithunscheduleddelays,preventinggoodsfromgetting
tomarketanddrivingupcosts.Thereisanaverageof52serviceinterruptionsadaythroughout
the system. Projects to repair and replace aging locks and dredge channels take decades to
approveandcomplete,exacerbatingtheproblemfurther.”(p.6)

Unscheduleddelaysimposehighercostsonshippersbecausetheyareunabletoplanaround
them appropriately.  When barge tows are forced to separate to move through a lock,
congestionanddelaysemerge.Italsoincreaseslockagetimes,particularlyathightrafficlocks
or during periods of heavy traffic.  Preventative maintenance designed to sustain locks and
preventbreakdownsisnotadequatelyfunded,leadingtoareactionarymentalitywhenlocksdo
fail (Grier, 2009).  When outages on the system occur, disruptions to barge traffic can have
significanteconomicrepercussions.Grier(2009)observedthat:

“An aging inland waterway infrastructure is not necessarily a concern as long as timely
investments are made in maintenance and major rehabilitations, with some capacity and
modernizationimprovementswhereneeded.”(p.3)

Basedonthestatusquo,manyprojectswillremainincompletefordecades,someasfaroutas
2090 (Colbert, 2013), which aggravates the current situation–where important projects go
unfunded(Hammond,2013).Thedelayscausedbylimitedfundsperpetuatecongestionissues
andadecreasethelongͲtermbenefitofusingthesystemwhileincreasingconstructioncosts.
Themountingbacklogofprojectsrepresentsatrendthat,ifnotaddressed,willhavesignificant
ramifications for the inland waterway system in the years ahead as the effects of deferred
constructionandmaintenancemultiplyandcompound.

Examiningtrendsinlockunavailability14illustratestheeffectsoflimitedfundingontheinland
waterway system.  Grier (2002) gathered data on lock outages in the 1990s and found that
aggregateoutagedurationhasdoubledinjustadecade.Shippingitinerariescanbemodifiedif
carriers know in advance about an outage, but those that are unscheduled can result in
expensivemodalshiftsanddelayedshipments.TheAmericanSocietyofCivilEngineers2013
ReportCardemphasizesunscheduleddelaysandsomeofthemaindriversofthesedelaysare
cited:

13

AgradeofDisdefinedas:poor,wheretheinfrastructure“isinpoortofairconditionandmostlybelowstandards,withmany
elementsapproachingtheendoftheirservicelife.”
14
DefinedbyGrier(2009)astimeoverayearinwhichthelockcouldnotaccommodatetrafficduetoavarietyofreasonswhich
mayincludeweather,waterlevels,lockproblems,etc.
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“Unscheduled delay is most often the result of high volumes at transit points, as well as
occasionalfailuresinequipment,resultinginincreasedoperatingcosts.”(p.39)

In 2011, total lock outages accounted for 9 percent of operational time, of which 3 percent
were unscheduled outages (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2012). This may represent a small
percentageoftotaloperationaltime,buttheimpactofanunscheduledoutageatahighͲtraffic
lockforalongperiodoftimecandecreasesystemefficiency.Overalongperiodoftime,this
scenariowillgrowmoreproblematic.Additionally,90percentoflocksanddamsexperienced
atleastoneunscheduleddelayin2009.Figure5showstheaveragedelayvesselsencountered
at locks.  The trend until 2009 appeared to be steady, if not slightly declining, but the most
recentyearsrevealsteepincreaseinaveragedelays.

Figure5:AverageDelayatLocksonInlandWaterwaySystem(inhours)
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Figures6and7illustratescheduledandunscheduledoutagesbynumberanddurationforthe
US inland waterway system.  Due to scheduled outages generally being more manageable,
much of the attention is directed toward unscheduled outages that can disrupt shipping and
create myriad issues for waterway users.  The number and time of unscheduled outages has
varied,butthegeneraltrendlineisoneofincreasingunavailability.
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Figure6:NumberofScheduledandUnscheduledUnavailabilityonInlandWaterwaySystem
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Figure7:ScheduledandUnscheduledUnavailabilityonInlandWaterwaySystem(inhours)
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AlongtheOhioRiverfrom2002to2011,unscheduledoutages—measuredinhours—increased
nearly 98 percent, while the number of total unscheduled outages increased 145 percent.15
Grier(2009)providesapossibleexplanationofincreasedoutagetimes:

“Scheduled maintenance and repairs are occurring more often, at more locations, and are
taking longer to complete; and unscheduled closures due to failures of a lock component, or
someotherincident,areoccurringmoreoften,atmorelocations,andarelikewisetakinglonger
tofix.”(p.4)

Longer and/or more frequent lock outages (especially unscheduled ones) can significantly
impactsystemreliability.Inturn,shippersmaydecreasetheirusageofthesystembyshifting
freighttoothermorereliablemodes.

V.Conclusion

The evidence compiled in this synthesis indicates several alarming trends, but also ample
opportunitiesforreform.Problemswiththesufficiencyofcurrentfundinglevelshaveeroded
systemconditionandledtodecliningreliability.Someproposalsargueformakingchangesto
theUSACE’sbudgetprocessandthewayprojectsareprioritized,whichshouldmeritattention.
However, the most pressing issue appears to be securing a reliable and sufficient funding
stream for the inland waterways system.  Coordinated investments will be necessary in the
comingyearstomaintainsystemperformancethroughindividuallocksanddamsthatfunction
interdependentlyaspartofthelargersystem.

Waterwayscurrentlyenjoy100percentfederalfundingforoperationsandmaintenance,along
with cost sharing on capital construction and major rehabilitation projects.  The funding
arrangementsareostensiblybeneficial,yetuncertaintyoverthefederalbudgetandconcerns
overdeficitspendingmaynegativelyimpactthislessvisibletransportationmode.Aginglocks
anddamswillneedincreasedmaintenanceifsystemreliabilityistobemaintainedatcurrent
levels, and other financial sources may have to be tapped to provide the required funding.
Increasesinlockoutagesdisruptingfreightshipmentshaveeconomicimpactsandcanreduce
theuseofamodethatalreadyhasunusedcapacityandcouldaccommodateincreasedtraffic.

TheIWTFservesasthekeyfundingmechanismforcapitalconstructionandmajorrehabilitation
projects. However, its balances have fallen close to zero in recent years and annual receipts
cannotmeetexistingprojectneeds.Becausethefueltaxthathasgoneunadjustedsince1995,
nominalrevenueshaveremainedstagnantwhileinflationhasdecreasedpurchasingpowerreal
dollars.Assuch,unfundedprojectscontinuetogrowinnumber,whichincreasescompetition
for funding and a produces a significant project backlog. As needs go unmet, costs rises and
infrastructuredeteriorationgoesonunimpeded.
15

Data gathered from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Lock Performance Monitoring System (LPMS), available at:
http://corpslocks.usace.army.mil/lpwb/f?p=121:1:1267106300118359.
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However,therehavebeenproposalstoincreasefundinglevelsandsecureareliablestreamof
futurerevenuesthatwillbesufficienttomeetpotentialincreasesindemand.Theseshouldbe
carefully considered by policymakers to ensure that the inland waterways system remains a
resilientmodeoftransportationabletokeeppacewiththenation’sgrowingeconomy.
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